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As the United States Navy operating agency for ocean
transportation, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates
a fleet of tankers to supply the military petroleum needs of
Defense Department units around the world. To fulfill
Defense requirements, MSC maintains a controlled fleet of
approximately thirty tankers that are either owned by the
government or are chartered on a long term basis from
commercial shipping companies. This thesis attempts to
analyze those market forces and cost factors that contribute
to the charter rate structure that has such a significant
impact on MSC operating costs. The market forces analyzed
are the worldwide demand for oil, the location of refin-
eries, advancing technology, and legislation. The tanker
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Military Sealift Command currently operates a fleet
of clean product tanker vessels in support of Department of
Defense and Department of Energy requirements throughout the
world. This study concerns itself with the clean product
tanker operations carried out by MSC chartered and
contracted ships in support of requirements as determined by
the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) in Alexandria,
Virginia. DFSC, as the Department of Defense (DOD) agency
responsible for fuel allocation, draws up annual predictions
for the quantity of petroleum it expects to be transported.
Using this estimate MSC configures its "controlled" tanker
fleet of Navy owned and long-term chartered vessels so that
it can handle about eighty-five per cent of anticipated
annual requirements. It then charters commercial tankers
when necessary to carry that petroleum which is beyond the
capacity of the controlled fleet. If requirements are less
than expected, MSC controlled fleet assets are put into a
ready reserve status for a period of time.
It is this mix of Navy contracted, long-term charter and
short-term or "spot" charter tankers that is fundamental to
this study. "The entire Defense petroleum distribution
network, including tankers, is designed and aimed at deliv-
ering the product at the cheapest cost to the customer,
which makes it similar to the commercial market within which
it exists" [Ref . 1]
.
As the operational and financial manager of these tanker
assets, MSC has a tremendous concern for the costs incurred
in transporting Defense fuel. Ideally, this fuel would be
shipped by the most cost effective means at all times, but
because of the sporadic nature of the tanker market, "the
most cost effective means" could change on an almost daily
basis
.
This thesis will review the basic organization of the
Tanker Division of the Military Sealift Command and the way
it does business. The study will culminate with a detailed
look at the market forces at work in the petroleum tanker
industry, and, in particular, how those forces affect the
Military Sealift Command and the configuration of its tanker
fleet.
It must be understood that this study is not concerned
with the Fleet Support, civil- service-manned T-AOs . These
vessels do not operate under the auspices of the Tanker
Division; they are, instead, controlled by the area commands
and operate under entirely different circumstances.
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II. TANKER OPERATIONS OVERVIEW
An understanding of the cost factors affecting MSC
tanker operations would not be complete without a basic
awareness of the mission and organization of the MSC tanker
fleet.
A. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND TANKER OPERATIONS MISSION
As an element of the Operations Office within MSC, the
Tanker Division acts as the Navy's sole representative in
the Defense petroleum distribution network and elaborates on
its mission as set forth in Figure 2.1 as follows:
Our nucleus fleet is employed in serving the overseas
lift requirement of the Department of Defense. It is
specifically sized to meet the lift requirements gener-
ated by the Defense Fuel Supply Center. The entire
Defense petroleum distribution network, including the
tankers, is designed and aimed at delivering the product
at the cheapest cost to the customer, which makes it
similar to the commercial market within which it exists.
[Ref. 2]
There are three basic activities in which the Tanker
Division fleet is involved.
1. The delivery of refined petroleum products to mili-
tary installations throughout the world.
2. Deliveries of petroleum to ships at sea.
3. The delivery of crude oil in support of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as directed by the Department
of Energy (DOE)
.
The first activity listed is considered to be the most
critical function undertaken by the Tanker Division. Most
of the effort expended by the personnel and the majority of
the costs incurred by the Division involve this first func-
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Dry cargo charter activities within MSC have always been
a managerial function of the individual area commands. Each
of these commands has its own personnel authorized to handle
contracting and chartering duties. Vessels are chartered on
a daily basis independent of headquarters command in
Washington. The reasons for centralized control of tanker
shipping are twofold. As discussed previously, the close
physical proximity of DFSC and MSC headquarters is a factor,
but even more important is the historical effect of the oil
embargoes that have taken place in the past and the resul-
tant criticality of fuel logistics in order to ensure
Defense readiness. Dry cargo operations are normally much
less "time critical" from MSC's point of view. The Military
Airlift Command (MAC) provides the military a rapid alterna-
tive to ocean transportation. There is no such reasonable
alternative when it comes to petroleum transportation, so
it is critical that control of petroleum shipments be
responsive. This is partially accomplished by centralizing
control at headquarters.
B. THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE FUEL SUPPLY CENTER
As previously mentioned, MSC transports petroleum as
directed by DFSC. DFSC was given this charter in 1973 and
placed under the direction of the Defense Logistics Agency,
which, in turn, is under the direction of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. DFSC continually collects fuel usage
data through its field offices throughout the world ( See
Figure 2.2) and uses the data to compile the Inventory
Management Plan (IMP).
The IMP is a forecast of the types of fuel that will be used
and the areas in which it will be used in the upcoming
fiscal year. It is published annually with regular quar-
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the information collected is reflected in the Defense
Guidance that is used to help formulate the budget proposal
presented by the President to Congress.
Both DFSC and MSC operate under financial conditions
similar to their commercial counterparts. In MSC's case,
financing is through the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) * while
DFSC is financed through the Defense Fuel Stock Fund. Both
systems are similar and provide the primary constraint that
a financial breakeven point is to be the goal. This is
achieved through the use of a rate system whereby customers
are charged for the services rendered and expenses are
debited from the balance.
These financial systems provide a cost reduction initia-
tive and, in addition, simplify activity accountability.
Since a large portion of the costs incurred by DFSC are fees
paid to MSC for transportation of the petroleum products,
the Command is constantly seeking less costly modes for fuel
transportation. Pipelines and barges have been much more
extensively utilized during recent years, but have yet to
dramatically affect the overall scope of operations.
C. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND TANKER DIVISION
As the sole agent of the Navy for transportation of
petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), Tanker Division
consists of two branches that perform the required func-
tions .
The Tanker Management Support Branch has several respon-
sibilities :
1. Develops operational plans, both short-range and
long-range
.
1 The Navy Industrial Fund will be explained in more
detail in Chapter 3, Section A.
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2. Develops policies and procedures for the world-wide
movement of POL.
3. Monitors and ensures accurate preparation of reports
upon which POL billings are based.
A. Prepares the Tanker Division overhead budget.
[Ref. 3]
The Tanker Operations branch exercises direct opera-
tional control over vessels chartered and contracted by MSC.
In addition, the branch keeps shipowners informed of the
movements of their ships and provides them with any informa-
tion deemed appropriate. As discussed previously, the branch
acts as the primary contact with DFSC. It also prepares
monthly estimates of tanker fleet capability and accordingly
initiates requests for additional charters or release
actions to reduce capability when required. [Ref. 4]
Within the headquarters organization in Washington, the
Tanker Division works very closely with the Chartering
Branch of the Contracting Office. For simplification
purposes, the pertinent portions of the MSC command struc-
ture are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
As depicted in Figure 2.3, the Contracting Office has
separate branches under the Chartering Division for dry
cargo and tanker operations. The Tanker Branch is
constantly involved in negotiations with shipping companies
and brokers. Its primary function is to arrange for trans-
portation of POL as economically as possible while, at the
same time, meeting the operational requirements of the move
as delineated by the Tanker Operations Branch of the Tanker
Division. If, in the opinion of the Charterting Division of
the Contracting Office, the only mode of transportation
available, within the constraints of the designated opera-
tional requirements, would incur unrealistic costs, then
consultation takes place between the Contracting Office and
























jj i 5-i i




3 i O i
/) i &i
— i a."
<U i P i 3 "
CJ i 01 l /) i
H 1 CU i
M l < -H l 4-> 1





C i U i
j-* .
<U i
H 1 1 1 a i
U 1 C i
cO i <o i
i-i i — H «
CU i CO 1
ai a.i




C i d !
cO i O l







CO 1 D i
ai
D i 5-i I
CU i
O i « 1
00 i C i
U i rt i






rt £ • •
Jh *a i CO






• 4-) 1 *4-l
fc C • o
4-1 O i















U i C CO
ai i o 5-i CO
O l D « d
H l o
M i CO o •H
M l u 60 4->
D i > J-i CO
i -O CO U
60 1 * J <VC i 1 Cuii >
H 1 1 f>. o
U 1 5-1
CJ i 60 3 cu
cO i C A
5-i i H •P
U 1 5-i
C • CU 4-1
O i 4-1 O
J 1 5-1
— 1 cO d


























DFSC is notified if it is felt that an alternative to the
move, as directed by them, should be pursued.
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III. THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF MSC TANKER OPERATIONS
As a prelude to an analysis of the market forces that
affect costs incurred as a result of MSC tanker operations,
an explanation of some of the more important concepts is
paramount. In this chapter, the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF),
charter classifications, and cost-affecting innovations in
the industry will be addressed.
A. THE NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
As has already been stated, MSC worldwide operations are
financed through the NIF.
The NIF is a revolving fund established to provide
working capital for industrial or commercial type activ-
ities of the Navy which provide goods or services to
agencies of the Department of Defense. The NIF is not
dependent upon Congressional appropriations since MSC
charges its customers for services provided in a manner
comparable to private business. The primary difference
between a government industrial fund and a commercial
business is that the objective of the government fund is
to break even rather than to return a profit. [Ref. 5]
Utilizing projected requirements data provided by the
Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, the MSC comptroller
prepares the annual budget for submission to the Defense
Department comptroller via the Navy comptroller. An initial
outlay of inventories and cash is made to an activity to
serve as the capital for operations. Items financed by MSC
from revenues received for transportation services provided
by the command include:
1. ship charter costs
2. provisions, supplies and materials
3. civilian payroll costs
4. travel expenses
5. spare parts for ships
19
6. maintenance , repair and alteration of ships




Pay for military personnel is funded from Navy appropri-
ated funds. Billing rates are then established to recover
command expenses. The MSC comptroller is also responsible
for billing for services rendered, maintenance of command
financial records, and payment of command obligations for
goods and services received.
If a profit is made in any fiscal year, or a loss is
incurred, the billing rates are adjusted in subsequent years
to recover losses incurred or to return profit to the spon-
sors. The command can obtain additional funds from the NIF
in the event a drastic and unexpected deviation from the
budget takes place, such as has occurred during past oil
embargoes. The financial cycle of the NIF, as it applies to
MSC, is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The billing rates utilized by MSC are designed to apply
uniformly to all shippers. While dry cargo rates are based
on the going commercial rates for various commodities moving
on breakbulk and container ships, POL rates are based on the
size of MSC controlled tankers and the number of discharge
and loading stops on one voyage.
MSC constructs a tariff based upon its projected costs
for carriage of a long ton-mile of POL products. As the
services are rendered, MSC bills DFSC for the cost of trans-
portation services. DFSC, in turn, adds the transportation
costs to the cost of the POL products and is reimbursed by
the armed services using the products. The armed services
are responsible for including in their appropriation
requests to Congress amounts adequate to cover the purchase
and transportation of POL products. Therefore, the dollar
costs of the operation of the tanker fleet are passed on
through the Navy Industrial Fund to the Operations and
20
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Dry Cargo | Petroleum | Project | Fleet Support |
i i i V
MSC PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES
| MSC INDUSTRIAL FUND |
| Billings | Receipts |<
Source: Military Sealift Command, Washington, D. C
Figure 3.1 Industrial Fund Financial Cycle.
Maintenance accounts of the armed services receiving the
products. [Ref. 6]
B. THE CLEAN PRODUCT TANKER
While the size of the world's tanker fleet has been
diminishing for several years, the forecast of the smaller
supply of vessels on which to transport POL is complicated
from MSC's perspective. With the exception of the crude
that is carried by MSC chartered vessels for DOE in support
of the SPR, most of the shipments of petroleum coordinated
by the Tanker Division are for shipments of refined fuels in
quantities too small to be economically transported in large
tankers. In fact, almost sixty per cent [Ref. 7] of the
fuel carried aboard Navy contracted or chartered vessels is
jet fuel, with the inherently stringent purification
21
requirements necessary for subsequently safe operational
utilization. ( See Figure 3.2)
Another factor limiting the supply of tanker resources
available to MSC for POL transportation is MSC's desire that
the vessels be multi-product capable. To conform to this
constraint requires that a relatively expensive coating be
applied to the tanks to be used. Specifically, MSC defines
a clean product tanker useful for its purposes as "a vessel
that is appropriately coiled, coated and compartmentalized
to enable it to carry several grades of petroleum products
without contaminating or mixing with other cargoes"
[Ref. 8]. Another important factor taken into consideration
in determining the type of vessels best suited for MSC POL
transportation purposes is the ship's size. DOD shipment
sizes rarely justify the use of a tanker with more than a
50,000 Deadweight Ton (DWT) 2 capacity, and many of the
ports in which MSC ships operate have water depths too
shallow for a vessel of larger than a 50,000 DWT capacity to
enter while loaded.
It can be seen in Figure 3.3 that, while the overall
number of tankers in the U.S. flag fleet is not signifi-
cantly less than it was ten years ago, the number of tankers
involved in the clean product trade has diminished at a
rapid rate. Figure 3.5 and figure 3.4 provide additional
statistics concerning product tanker availability.
C. CHARTER TYPES
An understanding of the different classifications of
vessel charters is essential in order to fully comprehend
the nature of the problem at hand.
Sometimes termed deadweight carrying capacity, is the
difference between the light and loaded displacements of a
ship. The deadweight (dwt) comprises the ballast, fresh































































































































































































































































































































































































































Time Charter . This type of charter can be an arrange-
ment that lasts for only a few weeks or for years. MSC time
charters vary from four months to twenty years in length.
In this arrangement, the shipowner is responsible for
providing the crew, managing the ship, and paying all oper-
ating costs except port charges, canal tolls and fuel. The
charterer has the right to use the ship in any location and
for any cargo that he chooses, except as prohibited by the
terms of the contract. The owner agrees to meet charter
provisions on speed and fuel consumption and to maintain the
ship in accordance with the standards of her class. The
charter rate is normally based on dollars per deadweight ton
per month or dollars per day. The contract usually provides
a provision for payment of increases of crew wages, stores
and subsistence if the charter period is more than one year.
[Ref. 10]
Bareboat Charter . In this type of charter arrangement,
the owner relinquishes management and control of his ship to
the chartering agency for several years, and sometimes for
the life of the ship. The charterer mans and operates the
ship, and is responsible for all costs of operation,
including port charges, fuel costs and canal tolls. He is
expected to return the ship to its owner, when the contract
expires, in good condition, subject to normal wear and tear.
The chartering agency pays at a rate expressed in terms
of a certain amount of deadweight tons per month or dollars
per day. For the owner of of the ship, such an arrangement
can be an investment opportunity, so the rate he negotiates
should cover depreciation and his profit. The charterer, on
the other hand, is able to pay for the ship as he uses it
instead of having to pay the entire cost in advance. MSC
operates under a number of bareboat charters, including nine
27
new tankers that were procured under "build and charter
programs". [Ref. 11] 3
Consecutive Voyage Charter ( CVC ) . The owner remains
completely responsible for the operation and cost of the
ship, including port and fuel charges. The charter provides
for the ship to make as many consecutive voyages as it can
in a specified period of time. Payment is expressed in
terms of the amount per ton of cargo carried and is normally
payable only upon the successful discharge of the cargo at
the end of the voyage. If the charterer does not supply a
full cargo, the charterer must pay for the unused space.
Again, there is usually a provision for payment of the esca-
lation of crew wages, bunkers, stores and subsistence.
[Ref. 12]
Single Voyage Charter . This is an arrangement similar
to the CVC except that it involves only one shipment instead
of several. This type of charter is normally referred to as
a "spot charter" and is a critical aspect of this study.
[Ref. 13]
Contract of Affreightment . This type of agreement calls
for the transportation of a specific amount of cargo in an
agreed upon trade and time period. The major difference is
that the owner does not commit specific ships. He has the
ability to provide any ships that meet the requirements and
fall within the size range as specified in the agreement.
The contract designates the approximate volume of cargo, the
description of the cargo and the voyages, and the time
period during which all the cargo must be moved.
This arrangement is attractive to a charterer since it
gives him more flexibility than most arrangements. It is
often a cheaper method of securing transportation because it
frequently allows a charterer to avoid paying for the ship's
3 Build and charter programs will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter III, Section D.
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ballast portion of a round-trip voyage. The rate is based
on the cargo tons loaded, expressed by a rate per ton of
cargo, and the cost of service is usually payable upon
completion of successful loading. [Ref. 14]
The rate structure of the various forms of charter
arrangements is somewhat complicated. Specific rates fluc-
tuate dramatically on a day-to-day basis, making it very
difficult to consistently choose charter types that will
continue to be the most cost effective arrangement available
throughout the life of the charter. Because of this fact,
it is critical that personnel involved in charter selection
and contract negotiations be aware of the market forces that
influence charter rates. An ability to forecast future
market conditions is absolutely essential in order to mini-
mize life cycle costs incurred. It is this constant attempt
to achieve a least cost solution to a charter arrangement,
within the operational constraints 4 specified that produces
the variety of charter types existing under MSC cognizance
at any given time.
D. CHARTERING PROCEDURES
After analysis of POL shipment directives from DFSC,
Tanker Division submits a requirement to the Contracting
Office. Upon receipt of these requirements, a Request for
Proposals is released to the maritime industry. The Bidders
Mailing List for tanker proposals totals over two hundred
firms. [Ref. 15]
Although not discussed previously, these "operational
constraints also include the necessity for a "surge" capa-
bility in the event of any contingency event that would
require rapid, frequent and, possibly, large volume moves of
POL around the world. The desired magnitude of this surge
capacity has been a matter of debate for many years and is
beyond the scope of this study.
29
The evaluation of offers received in response to










8. tank coating condition (although a certification
inspection will still be conducted by a MSC engineer
prior to onload)
9. cargo previously carried
10. number of cargo tank systems
11. capacity of the cargo tank systems.
An analysis of the charter market is an ongoing activity
in the Contracting Office. An awareness of the prices being
paid on the commercial market for the tonnages in question,
as well as the availability of shipping, forms the basis
from which the negotiations are conducted with offerors who
were responsive to the Request for Proposals. Negotiations
for charter hire normally cover the following areas:
1. the period of the charter
2. the charter rate
3. the terms and conditions required by the Government
4. where the Government would take delivery of the ship
5. at what port the ship would be delivered to the
shipowner upon completion of the charter
6. escalation payments
7. when escalation payments would become effective.
[Ref. 16]
Negotiations for long-term time charters or build-and-
charter programs involve all facets of cost and operational
factors. All of the resources within MSC are utilized to
30
improve the Government's negotiating position. The exper-
tise available includes operations, counsel, comptroller,
engineering, and can even include the U. S. Coast Guard, the
Maritime Administration, or shipping organizations.
Some charter agreements contain options for the exten-
sion of all time lost due to a vessel's inability to
perform. The decision as to whether to exercise one of
these options requires the same thoughtful analysis as that
utilized in determining the original contract.
E. BUILD AND CHARTER PROGRAMS
The principle upon which the Build-and-Charter program
is based is a simple one. The Government enters into an
agreement with a commercial firm which specifies that if the
firm constructs a designated number of tankers in accordance
with Government specifications, the Government will charter
the vessels at an agreed upon rate and, normally, in a
manner that will protect the investment in the long run.
The advantage of this program to MSC is obvious. It enables
the Navy to increase its tanker assets on a long-term basis
without being required to seek Congressional authorization
to do so. Payment for the charters is funded through the
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OM,N) fund, although close
Congressional scrutiny certainly takes place. Since the
Build and Charter program is generally considered a success
from both the Navy and maritime industry perspectives, it
is worthwhile to review the program in a little more detail.
In August 1974, the first of nine 25,000 DWT Sealift
class product tankers was delivered to MSC. It was not the
first time that a build and charter technique had been used
by the Navy to acquire new assets 5 but it was, by far, the
5 As a matter of fact, nineteen previous build and
charter arrangements had been entered into since 1952.
[Ref. 17]
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most ambitious of the projects.
The first attempt to acquire tankers through the program
came in 1968. Requests for Proposals (RFPs) were issued for
a long-term CVC of nine newly constructed tankers. Because
of the rising interest rates in that year, the prospective
owner of the ships was unable to secure the necessary
financing. The program was subsequently stopped.
In 1970 a review determined that the build and charter
method could be successful only if the Government assumed
the risk of fluctuations in the interest rates for the
financing of the vessels.
In February 1971, a new RFP was issued, and fourteen
offers were received. These offers were analyzed on the
basis of discounting the respective charter payments over
twenty years. The offers were then compared on a least-cost
basis and on the ability to satisfactorily achieve the spec-
ifications and requirements established for the nine
tankers. [Ref. 18]
In August, 1971, MSC accepted a bid from a consortium
consisting of Marine Transport Lines, Inc., Salomon
Brothers, and First National City Bank of New York. This
consortium, acting through Marine Transport Lines (MTL)
,
awarded contracts at the end of that year to Todd Shipyards
Corporation and Bath Iron Works for the construction of a
total of nine tankers. Table I shows the fixed-price
contract costs.
MSC took an active role, during the formulation of the
agreement, in the financial structuring of the consortium's
investment to help ensure the greatest return on their
investment. MSC sought advice from the Internal Revenue
Service concerning depreciation schedules and allowable tax
deferrals. The IRS ruled, in mid- 1972, that the consortium
could be treated as a partnership and that ninety-five per
cent of the cost of the tankers could be depreciated in
32
TABLE I
Contract Prices for the Sealift Tankers
uontractor Unit Price Units Total Price
Bath $16,031,000 5 $80,155,000
Todd $16,595,000 4 $86,380,000
Total: $146,535,000
Source: General Accounting Office
about fourteen years. The charter hire rates were based
upon a target rate of return desired on the equity invest-
ment and resulted in a net effective interest rate slightly
lower than the prevailing interest rates on direct U. S.
Treasury obligations. [Ref. 19]
The terms of the contract specified that
MSC holds firm charters for five years with options to
extend to twenty years. At any time after the first
five year period, the charters can be terminated upon
six months notice. If the charters are terminated before
the fourteenth year, MSC liability to the equity inves-
tors is so great that it cannot profitably afford to do
so. MSC is liable for the termination value of the
ships, which for the first twelve years is 122.5 per
cent of the capitalized costs. Thereafter the termina-
tion value declines to 32.5 per cent of capitalized
costs in the twentieth year. Since the nine \Sealift)
tankers were constructed specifically to satisfy a long-
term MSC requirement, the risk of termination, if exis-
tent appears very remote. However, if termination is
due to loss or seizure of the ship, a stipulated loss
value equal to the termination value of each year is to
be paid by the Government. [Ref. 20]
Maritime law stipulates that under these charter terms,
MSC has all the rights and obligations of an owner. The
title of legal owner is a security title held by the consor-
tium. Under the terms of the charter, MSC must ensure that
the ships
:
1. are kept free from all liens
33
2. remain in class with the American Bureau of Shipping
3. are documented under U. S. Coast Guard regulations.
[Ref. 21]
At the termination of the contract, MSC must return the
ships to their legal owners. Only if MSC defaults on its
obligations does the legal owner have the right to repossess
the vessels or to terminate the charter.
In the early stages of this program, the Navy utilized a
bareboat charter approach in operating the Sealift class
tankers. While chartering them from the owner, they were
manned and operated by civil service mariners. This
arrangement was eventually modified to that which we find
today, where MSC actually enters into a contractual agree-
ment with MTL , Inc
.
, who, in turn, mans and operates the
ships under Navy direction.
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IV. THE COMPOSITION OF THE TANKER FLEET
A. CHARTER STRUCTURE WITHIN THE FLEET
Although the nature of the MSC tanker fleet structure is
one of constant change, it is useful to review its specific
makeup at a recent point in time. Figure 4.1 depicts the
controlled tanker fleet inventory on 24 August 1984. A
review of MSC records illustrates that the composition of
the fleet on that day was very typical for recent years.
Within the structure of that fleet, ten vessels were under
normal time charter, two vessels were operating under bare-
boat charter terms, three were Navy owned and civil sevice
manned, eight were contractor manned and operated and one
was a tug and barge owned by the Navy and manned by civil
service mariners.
The three Navy owned and civil service mariner (CIVMAR)
manned tankers are designated T-l tankers and are small,
older ships that have been operating under the control of
Commander, Military Sealift Command, Far East, headquartered
in Yokohama, Japan. The ships have been transporting POL in
the mid-Pacific and western Pacific areas but are scheduled
to be transferred to the Ready Reserve Force in the near
future
.
Figure 4.2 reveals the breakdown of the charter arrange-
ments within the controlled fleet, by listing charter clas-
sifications and the inventory of ships within each
classification. This specific inventory represents the
fleet structure in July 1984.
During the past year the size of the controlled fleet
diminished from twenty-eight vessels to twenty-four. This
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Source: Military Sealift Command
Figure 4.2 Controlled Fleet Inventory By Charter Type.
the waterborne transportation requirements specified by
DFSC. In this case, DFSC decided to use pipelines to
deliver approximately 14 million gallons of POL [Ref. 22] to
U. S. East Coast locations by way of the Gulf Coast. DFSC
37
is expected to continue its efforts to utilize pipelines
wherever feasible. Table II illustrates the trend that has
taken place in the number of different types of charter
arrangements undertaken. It can be seen that the breakdown
remained relatively consistent over the four year period.
Besides the increase in pipeline utilization to satisfy
DFSC requirements whenever practical, tug and barge combina-
tions are beginning to impact the cost structure of Defense
POL transportation. It is simply less expensive to haul the
same quantity of petroleum on a tug and barge than it is to
haul it on a 10,000 to 50,000 DWT tanker. The reasons are
obvious (crew size, fuel consumption, etc.) but will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Despite the
speed disadvantage suffered, all indications are that tug
and barge combinations will begin to take on an increasingly
important role in the movement of Defense fuels.
B. THE U. S. FLAG FLEET
It is important, at this stage to have an understanding
of the makeup of the U. S. flag fleet since it is this fleet
that is the primary resource from which MSC assets are
drawn. Although it is not prohibited for MSC to charter
foreign flag vessels as long as either a voluntary contrac-
tual agreement or a nation-to-nation agreement exists, it is
obviously politically inexpedient to do so except as a last
alternative. It has been argued that the fact that a U. S.
flag fleet exists at all is mainly due to the Jones Act.
At the end of June 1984 this fleet was made up of 218
vessels totalling 14.46 million DWT. [Ref. 23] Table III
illustrates the distribution of the fleet among size
categories
.
The Jones Act is protective Congressional legislation
that prohibits any foreign flag vessel from conducting trade
between U. S. ports.
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TABLE II
Trends in Types of Charters
1979 1980 1981 1982
Time Charters









28 29 30 26
Note:
The figures were derived by averaging quarterly
statistics from each category and rounding them
to the nearest whole number. They are presented
in order to provide an example of the typical MSC
tanker fleet configuration.
Source: Military Sealift Command
Comparing the information provided in Table III with
similar information on the world fleet which is provided in
Table IV, it can be seen that the average size for the U. S.
flag fleet is 66,000 DWT , while for the world fleet it is
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TABLE III





























Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd
98,500 DWT. In terms of deadweight tons, thirty-eight per
cent of the U. S, fleet is less than 70,000 DWT, compared
with ninteen per cent for the world fleet. Very Large and
Ultra Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs/ULCCs ) make up fifty- five
per cent of the world fleet while comprising only thirty-two
per cent of the U. S. flag fleet. These size statistics are
a reflection of the draft limitations faced at most U. S.
ports. On the U. S. East and Gulf Coasts the largest
tankers that can actually enter port fully loaded are those
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of approximately 70,000 DWT , while the West Coast is limited































Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd
Table V illustrates the age distribution of the U. S.
flag tanker fleet. It reveals that about twenty-two per
cent of the fleet is over ninteen years old compared with
six per cent for the world fleet. But, at the same time,
forty-seven per cent of the U. S. fleet has been built since
1975, comparing favorably to the fifty-three per cent of the
world fleet built since that same year.
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TABLE V
Age of U. S. Tankers










Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd.
C. AREAS OF OPERATIONS
Tanker assets of the Military Sealift Command controlled
fleet and spot charter vessels under single voyage contract
to MSC operate over routes between U. S. military installa-
tions all over the world, but certainly some more than
others. The U. S. Gulf coast, for instance, is heavily
travelled by MSC tankers due to the fact that it is a
primary offload point for POL destined for continental
42
United States Defense activities via pipeline, rail car,
highway, or coastal vessel. In the past few years, the
Indian Ocean has become an increasingly active operating
area for MSC tankers, not only because of the strategic
importance of the Diego Garcia installation, but also
because of the growing use of the CONSOL. The CONSOL, or
consolidated lift of opportunity is an operational concept
whereby a MSC tanker is used to either directly refuel ships
of the on-station Battle Group or to replenish the Battle
Group's fleet tanker. A growing percentage of controlled
fleet tankers are capable of performing this mission.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the common tanker routes and their
proportionate traffic, while Figure 4.4 illustrates the
average tanker disposition by operating area.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter has served to define the assets from which
MSC is able to draw its tanker resources. It has also
provided information concerning the recent charter structure
of the current controlled fleet and the areas in which the
fleet operates. The following chapter will attempt to
analyze the market forces and cost factors that affect the
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V. TANKER MARKET FORCES AND COST FACTORS
The most fundamental premise of the market forces at
work in the tanker industry is that the demand for tanker
vessels is a derived demand, based almost exclusively on the
general demand for oil itself. This can have a variety of
effects on MSC interests. First, in times of low oil
demand, the demand for tankers to move oil is generally
weak, normally resulting in more favorable charter rates for
any organization desiring to have oil moved. On the other
hand, a long run result of a low demand condition could very
likely be a reduction in the number of tankers available on
the market, causing a long run shift in the supply of
tankers available and an eventual opposite effect on charter
hire rates.
The current state of the industry continues to be low
demand, due to the post-embargo phenomenon of wide scale oil
conservation and the resultant "glut" on the world market.
Tanker demand has, therefore, been low, and supply of avail-
able tankers has already experienced dramatic reduction in
the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) category, but only
modest reduction in the size range that MSC considers useful
for its purposes.
The U. S. military has followed world trends in POL
transportation in the past decade. As illustrated in Figure
5.1 the quantity of petroleum transported aboard MSC tankers
since the late 1960's has decreased dramatically. This
decrease is explained by several factors
.
This decrease is explained by several factors.
1. The first, and most obvious was the decline of activ-





2. As a result of the Arab oil embargo suffered in late
1973 and early 1974, the military placed a strong
emphasis on fuel conservation. This emphasis was
manifested in a much more rigorous system of account-
ability for fuel usage, which was closely monitored
by operational and administrative commanders as well
as DFSC, which was founded in 1973 to perform just
such watchdog and coordinative functions.
3. A new emphasis was placed on alternatives to the
large consumption engines of ships, aircraft and
ground vehicles and efforts were made to replace the
more wasteful units wherever practical. Energy
conservation in military facilities was also heavily
stressed.
This chapter will summarize and analyze those factors
and market forces which contribute to tanker costs and,
thus, affect the charter rates MSC is subjected to in the
accomplishment of its mission.
A. OVERVIEW OF MARKET FORCES CURRENTLY IN EXISTENCE
The product tanker industry is affected by the following
forces
:
1. worldwide demand for oil
2. location of refineries
3. advancing technology
4. legislation. [Ref. 26]
Each of these forces will be addressed individually.
1 . Worldwide Demand
The worldwide demand for oil, as previously stated,
is considered to be relatively weak, resulting in a weak
demand for tanker assets. Table VI provides some statis-
tical indication of the level of recent overcapacity.
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TABLE VI
Surplus to Demand Ratios for the World Tanker Market
Representative Periods
Tanker Size(DWT) Dec 81 Jan 82 Aug 83 Jul 83 Nov 83
10,000- 39,999 +11% +11% +20% +19%. +15%
40,000-149,999 +27% +27% +24% +34% +35%
150,000+ +81% +78% +110% +136% +115%
Note: The surplus to demand ratio is simply the ratio
of tankers available for hire to those actually
hired for charter.
Source: Lloyd's Shipping Economist
The outlook is for little change in the market until
at least the turn of the century, but "outlooks" in oil
market analyses are often found to be absolutely wrong. In
fact, the petroleum industry is proving to be one of the
most difficult to accurately forecast, as evidenced in
recent years. Nevertheless, for budgeting reasons, an
attempt must be made to ascertain the future of the market.
One of the most respected institutions that is involved in
shipping industry forecasting is Drewry Shipping
Consultants. Based on industry projections of supply and
demand, Drewry makes the following assumptions :
1. Oil product consumption is forecast to increase to
1985 and then fall until 1990. ( See Table VII)
2. Production is forecast to decline slightly after
1985.
3. A decrease in crude oil movements is forecast by 1990
while a significant increase in (clean) products is
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forecast by that same year. This rise in products
movements is due to a huge increase in products
imports expected from the Middle East by 1990. These
imports are expected to rise from about one million
tons in 1985 to about 22 million tons in 1990 as a
result of a large increase in the number of refin-
eries in that part of the world. Of course, this is
an economic forecast and does not address the poten-
tiality of complete disruption of the refining
industry in that part of the world as a result of
international conflict. [Ref. 27]
TABLE VII
U. S. Production and Consumption 1980-1990
Year Production Consumption Net Imports (a)
1980 484 794 310
1982 485 706 221
1983(b) 485 700 215
1985 465 712 247
1990 446 688 242
Notes: (a) During the historical period net imports




Data is in millions of tons per year.
Source: BP Statistical Review 1984
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Drewry ' s forecast elaborates on the last aspect of
increased products importation from the Middle East by-
stating that the refinery capacity of the United States East
Coast is expected to fall from the 727 million tons produced
in 1981 to 640 million tons by 1990. Already, refinery
closures have taken place and plans for more to do so have
been finalized. [Ref. 28] Although it is assumed that there
will be an increase in capacity utilization in the U. S.
refineries of from seventy-two per cent in the early 1980s
to about seventy-six percent by 1990, this is not expected
to significantly offset the effect of the reduction in
refinery facilities. The demand for refined products is
expected to remain somewhat stable throughout the period in
question, but, given the expected decrease in U. S. industry
capacity, the U. S. will not be able to supply the demand,
and greater imports will result. These imports are not
expected to originate from the traditional areas, but,
instead, from the Middle East and North Africa. Because the
distances from these locations to the United States East
Coast are much greater than from the Caribbean, which is the
current primary supplier of refined products, there will be
a disproportionate increase in tanker demand generated by
the increase in products demand ( Figure 5.2).
2 . Location of Refineries
"Geographically , the initial consideration lies in
the location of crude oil resources in relation to the
refined product market. Theoretically, as long as oceans
separate crude oil suppliers from petroleum markets, tankers
will be in demand" [Ref. 29]. With the exception of the U.
S. refinery industry, which was discussed in the previous
subsection and of which we are more concerned for the
purposes of this study, this theory has lost some impact in
recent years as developing and some established countries
51
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Source : Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd.
Figure 5.2 U.S. Tanker Demand by Vessel Size Category
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have increased their number of refineries. "These localized
refineries allow petroleum markets to take advantage of
economies of scale by transporting larger quantities of
crude to the market area, thereby reducing transportation
costs as well enabling the use of other transportation modes
(i.e., pipelines, etc.)" [Ref. 30]. The growth of pipeline
construction has been a logical result of this phenomenon.
From MSC's perspective, another extremely important
factor of refinery location pertains to depth of water at
refinery port facilities.
Economically, a large ship in clean trade would lose
money. Its service would be limited to ports large
enough to accomodate it. It would spend excessive time
in port, loading and discharging, because the throughput
of most refineries and discharge areas is still geared
to the small clean product tanker. [Ref. 31]
3 . Advancing Technology
The technology aspect of tanker market forces is one
which, due to its deliberate, evolutionary nature, can be
anticipated with more certainty as to the effect it will
have on the market. Currently, there are several innova-
tions that are either in the conceptual or design stage or
are in their operational infancy. Among these are:
1. Pipelines . Although pipeline technology is nothing
new, the extent to which it is now being utilized and
its anticipated growth as a transportation medium for
POL is unprecedented. The most immediate effect of
pipeline expansion will surely be an increase in the
overcapacity of tankers in the size range useful to
MSC.
2. Tug and barge combinations . This technology, also,
has been available for many years, but has only
recently gained dramatically in popularity within the
industry as a means to transport large quantities of
POL over large distances . The cost savings in
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personnel and fuel could no longer be overlooked. It
is anticipated that MSC will continue to increase its
utilization of this technique in the foreseeable
future. Figure 5.3 compares the capabilities and
costs of an integrated tug/barge unit and a tanker.
3. Ultra shallow draft vessels ( USDVs ) . Currently on
the drawing boards is a vessel that will have the
capacity of deep draft tankers but with a much shal-
lower draft. Tank space compensation will take place
in a much wider beam, and the decreased hydrodynamics
will be compensated for with increased engine horse-
power. Obviously, with the increased horsepower will
come increased fuel costs. Data on the proposed USDV
are provided in Table VIII.
4 . Legislation
Several impending and recently enacted legislative
acts, both national and international, are expected to exert
profound influence on tanker market forces in the years to
come. Among the most significant of these legislative
actions is the 1978 Protocol sponsored by the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization at the
1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention. Effective in May of
1981, this legislation required that strict new safety and
pollution control measures be adopted by a large portion of
the international shipping industry. In 1978 the United
States adopted these measures into the Port and Tanker
Safety Act. The most significant portion of the act
pertained to the requirement for segregated ballast tank
systems (SBT) and inert gas systems (IGS). IGS is an exten-
sive modification to existing tank systems requiring that
non-flammable, inert gases be introduced into the tanker
piping systems rather than volatile oxygen combinations.
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Comparison of Conventional Tankers with Proposed USDV



















Source: Tanker Register and Motor Ship, September , 1981
The costs involved in IGS installation are signifi-
cant, approaching one million dollars for a product tanker
of forty to fifty thousand DWT. Tanker owners would have no
alternative but to either pass these costs on to the
customer or consider retiring the vessel from service to
avoid the installation expense.
While the the IGS portion of the act is primarily
safety oriented, the portion mandating the SBT systems is
environmentally oriented. The SBT concept involves
reserving certain tanks for ballast in order to prevent the
pumping of contaminated gaseous mixtures overboard to make
room for ballast. The impact of this portion of the act is
obvious. The segregated ballast tanks represent lost
56
product capacity, a factor which is certain to affect the
cost structure.
In any case, the cost of conforming to this legisla-
tion is currently one of MSC's greatest concerns. It is
still not clear what the impact of the the new requirements
will be on the size of that portion of the tanker fleet that
MSC considers to be useful for its purposes. At mid-1983,
twenty-eight per cent of the total products tanker fleet was
at least fifteen years old and approaching the end of its
useful life. Of this tonnage, ninety per cent was smaller
than 40,000 DWT , and very little of it met the regulations
requiring IGS
.
B. TANKER COST FACTORS
1 . Operating Costs
One of the main influences on total operating cost
trends are the movements in manning costs, as these costs
account for forty to fifty per cent of the total. "While
the general level of inflation will continue to be the prin-
cipal determinant of manning costs , the activities of
national seamen's unions and the International Transport
Federation (ITF) will also have a significant impact on
average manning costs" [Ref. 32]. Currently, manning costs
on convenience- flag vessels are increasing at a faster rate
than those on European or U. S. rates, although they still
are not comparable. [Ref. 33]
One area which promises to improve the manning cost
situation is the trend towards smaller crews. This trend
has been most evident among the high cost flags such as
those of northern Europe or the United States. Norway, for
instance, and despite intense labor pressure, has approved
shipownersreducing their crews by up to eight men on the
larger tankers. Japan, also, has been experimenting with
57
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smaller crews, operating a series of demonstration ships
with eighteen man crews and eventually planning to man some
of the same size vessels with sixteen men. Under this
concept, the crew is considered to be dual purpose with deck
and engineroom personnel totally interchangeable.
Obviously, with current ship designs and the strength of
maritime labor, this innovation will not be adopted quickly,
if at all.
Repair and maintenance costs have increased at a
rapid rate in recent years. One reason for this is wide-
spread conversion to IGS and SBT systems, but a contributing
factor is more rigid material standards being enforced by
maritime authorities.
2 . Voyage Costs
Primarily as a result of the rapidly rising fuel
costs of the last decade, voyage costs have become, in many
cases, the most significant cost factor for tanker opera-
tors. In the short term, many shipowners were attempting to
combat this increase with slow-steaming policies, but this
often had the effect of increasing operating and capital
elements of total transportation costs per cargo ton.
[Ref. 34] Instead, tanker operators have now turned to
energy efficient designs for new construction and are incor-
porating some aspects of these improved design factors in
ships already in operation. These innovations include:
1. slow-speed, fuel efficient main engines
2. improved hull forms
3. ducted and controllable pitch propellers
4. anti-fouling hull coatings
5. waste heat recycling.
These design improvements have resulted in reductions of up
to one-third the original fuel consumption rate in those




Practically all tankers currently on order worldwide
feature some or all of these design innovations. As more
and more of these vessels enter the market and an increasing
number of those already operating adopt some of the
features, the fuel efficient tanker will become the bench-




The changes in capital costs in recent years has
taken place not so much in the quantity or the nature of the
costs but in their allocation. In other words, the amount
of capital required to enter the tanker market has not
changed significantly in recent years, but the recipients of
those funds have changed. Japan, for many years the ship-
building giant, is receiving increasing competition from
several of the emerging nations, such as South Korea and
Taiwan. It is expected that this new competition will
prevent a significant increase in new shipbuilding prices in
the next few years
.
4 Conclusion
Although at first glance any discussion of the
economics of petroleum transportation would appear to lack
any cohesion, the one central theme is that all of the indi-
vidual factors contribute to the rate level that a customer
will be subjected to if he hires a tanker to move his POL.
Most of these factors are not controllable from the ship-
per's perspective, but a thorough understanding of all the
factors is essential in order to make short run and long run
decisions concerning alternative modes of transportation,
purchase of his own vessels, or delay of the move altogether




VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was originally intended to pursue a minimum
cost solution to an optimum mix of tanker charter types. But
it became apparent during the interviews and data collection
phase that the erratic nature of the tanker market and the
rapidly changing economic environment would preclude such a
quantitative approach. The essential determination of the
constraints necessary to accomplish such a solution were
beyond the scope of this study. Instead, an attempt has
been made to present the material necessary to understand
the tanker market and how its future will affect the trans-
portation of Defense POL.
It is apparent that there is a very immediate area of
concern, that of the future impact of the legislation
concerning Segregated Ballast Tanks and Inert Gas Systems.
It is apparent that the size of that portion of the product
tanker market which MSC considers useful for its purposes is
going to decrease as vessels are scrapped to avoid the
capital expenditures necessary to bring them within the
legislated guidelines. To avoid higher charter rates that
will result from this tanker supply situation, alternative
transportation modes must be considered. Of those
discussed, the most advantageous appears to be the tug and
barge combination. The data presented in this study is
evidence of the suitability of this mode of transportation
for most contingencies.
Operational readiness and contingency preparation (surge
capacity) were considered to be beyond the scope of this
study, which was to focus, primarily, on the economic
aspects of tanker operations.
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